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INTRODUCTION
The last twenty years have witnessed a "revolution" in family law.
It is a revolution that reflects changing societal values and assump-
tions about the family. Nowhere is this change more evident than in
the area of child custody.' The changes that have taken place in the
law of child custody reveal new parental expectations and
postdivorce family patterns. These changes have been described as a
"second wave," coming on the heels of the no-fault movement of the
1970s.2
Sole custody has emerged as a casualty of this "second wave."
The traditional sole custody arrangement is no longer the only op-
tion a court may exercise in the face of divorce.3 The great majority
1. The amount of legal and sociological literature in the area of child custody is
monumental. Among the more important works are M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE
DISPOSABLE PARENT: THE CASE FOR JOINT CUSTODY (1978); D. LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUS-
TODY: A STUDY OF FAMILIES AFTER DIVORCE (1982); andJ. WALLERSTEIN &J. KELLY,
SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980).
2. Folberg, joint Custody Law-The Second Wave, 23J. FAM. L. 1 (1984).
3. Generally in a sole custody arrangement, the legal and physical custody of
the child is given to one parent. Legal custody usually refers to the right of the custo-
dial parent to make the major decisions that affect the child's upbringing. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 3 (a)(1988) (legal custody defined as "the right to de-
termine the child's upbringing, including education, health care, and religious train-
ing"). Physical custody usually refers to the residence of the child with the custodial
parent and the right of the custodial parent to make the routine day to day decisions
1
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of states today have passed some kind of joint custody legislation.4
The growing trend towards awarding joint custody reflects the
courts' belief that joint custody is usually in the best interests of the
child.5
While the courts tend to agree that joint custody is often in the
best interests of the child, there is less agreement on how to address
a parent's request to move with a child out of state. Some jurisdic-
tions have taken a liberal approach to removal,6 while others have
been nothing less than hostile to such a request. 7 Jurisdictions that
recognize a custodial parent's right to move with the child have
tended to identify the best interests of the child with the best inter-
ests of the custodial parent. 8 Thus, a request for removal will gener-
ally be granted unless the noncustodial parent can show that the
move is not in the best interests of the child or specific harm will
come to the child if removal is granted. 9
Jurisdictions that take a more conservative approach to removal
that affect the child. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 3 (c) (1988) (physical
custody defined as "routine daily care and control").
4. Joint custody can either be joint legal custody or joint physical custody. In a
joint legal custody arrangement, both divorced parents equally share in the major
decisions that affect the child's upbringing. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.003 (b)
(1988) (joint legal custody defined as both parents having "equal rights and responsi-
bilities including the right to participate in major decisions determining the child's
upbringing including education, health care, and religious training"). Joint physical
custody generally refers to the shared residence of the child with both parents and
their right to share equally in making the ordinary day to day decisions that affect the
child. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.003 (d) (1988) ("joint physical custody means that
the routine daily care and control and the residence of the child is structured be-
tween the parties").
Generally, in a joint custody arrangement, joint legal custody is shared by both
parents while physical custody is given to one of the parents. For purposes of this
Note, the custodial parent will be defined as the parent who has physical custody of
the child whether or not the parent also has joint or sole legal custody.
5. This trend results from recognition by social scientists that children in joint
custody arrangements are better adjusted than those in sole custody settings. See
generally WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 344-56.
6. In Illinois, for example, a custodial parent need only show that the move
would not harm the child. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Burgham, 86 Ill. App. 3d 341,
346, 408 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1980).
7. In New York, for example, a custodial parent must show "exceptional cir-
cumstances" that would justify removal. See, e.g., Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191,
194, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 487-88, 505 P.2d 14, 15-16
(1972) ("[I]n the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, decisions of the custo-
dial parent reasonably made in a good faith attempt to fulfill the responsibility im-
posed by the award of custody, should be presumed to be made in the best interests
of the children"); Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 398-99 (Minn. 1983) (there is a
presumption that permission to remove should be granted where there is no showing
that the move is not in the best interests of the child).
9. See, e.g., D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 212, 365 A.2d 27, 33
1026 [Vol. 15
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hold that the best interests of the child are not necessarily identified
with the best interests of the custodial parent. o This judicial per-
spective requires that the burden of proof be placed on the parent
choosing to remove the child to show that the move is in the best
interests of the child.II In either case, courts have justified their de-
cisions under the rubric of the "best interests" of the child.
Minnesota has adopted a "liberal" right to move position. In
1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Auge v. Auge,12 established a
presumption that a custodial parent's request to move with a child
out of state is in the best interests of the child where sole custody
has been awarded.13 This presumption was extended by the court
later that year, in Gordon v. Gordon,14 to include joint custody
arrangements. 15
The burden of proof is on the parent opposing removal to show
that removal would endanger the child's physical or emotional health
and that it is "not in the child's best interests."16 The parent oppos-
ing removal must make a prima facie showing to support a decision
not to grant removal.17 Only after such a showing will an evidentiary
hearing be held to determine if the move will endanger the child.18
The court's decisions in Auge and Gordon raise serious questions as
to whether the best interests of the child are truly protected by the
court in a removal setting. They also raise questions as to whether
the Minnesota Legislature's statutory purposes for awarding joint
custody have any meaning when the custodial parent decides to
move.
Minnesota's statutory scheme for awarding joint custody is based
on the fundamental premise that a child in a family setting develops
attachments to both parents and that it is in the best interests of the
child for those attachments to remain following divorce.19 This is
also the basic premise for granting visitation.20 The child has an in-
terest in maintaining a close emotional and psychological support
relationship with both the custodial and noncustodial parent. The
(Ch. Div. 1976) (noncustodial parent has burden of showing harm to the child as a
result of removal).
10. See, e.g., Whitman v. Whitman, 28 Wis.2d 50, 57, 135 N.W.2d 835, 839 (1965)
(best interests of the child requires an independent court inquiry).
11. Id. at 59, 135 N.W.2d at 839.
12. 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983).
13. Id. at 399.
14. 339 N.W.2d 269 (Minn. 1983).
15. Id. at 271.
16. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399; Gordon, 339 N.W.2d at 270.
17. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399; Gordon, 339 N.W.2d at 270-71.
18. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399; Gordon, 339 N.W.2d at 278.
19. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1986).
20. See generally WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1 at 544-67.
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child has an interest in having a well-adjusted custodial parent who
provides for the child's day-to-day needs. The child also has an in-
terest in maintaining a stable and continued relationship with the
noncustodial parent.
These two interests may conflict with one another when one par-
ent requests to move. If the custodial parent decides to move, one
parental relationship is bound to suffer. Allowing the move might
affect the continuity of the relationship between the child and the
noncustodial parent. If the move is denied, the child's interest in
having a well-adjusted custodial parent may be impaired. The ques-
tion then becomes how the best interests of the child can be pro-
tected when these interests are at odds with one another.21
In Auge and Gordon, the court answered this question by identifying
the interests of the child with those of the custodial parent. 2 2 The
court, in effect, balanced the interests of the custodial parent in re-
questing to move with the interests of the noncustodial parent in op-
posing the move. 23 All of this was done under the guise of the best
interests of the child.24
This Note will first examine the court's trend of moving away from
the sole custody arrangement and towards awarding joint custody.
Second, it will examine the issues surrounding visitation and child
modification in Minnesota and other jurisdictions. Third, this Note
will examine how different jurisdictions have addressed the issue of
child removal after divorce. Finally, it will examine the basis of the
presumption established by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Auge
and Gordon.
This Note concludes that it is time for the Minnesota courts to re-
examine their position of liberally permitting child removal when
joint custody has been awarded. The court should no longer Simply
identify the best interests of the child with those of the custodial par-
21. This conflict was addressed by the court in In Re Marriage of Burgham, 86 111.
App. 3d. 341, 408 N.E.2d 37 (1980). The Illinois appellate court stated,
Permitting the spouse to remove the child may indirectly benefit the child by
enabling that spouse to remain as custodian. It also seems that, other things
being equal, granting such a request would likely indirectly benefit the child
by making the custodian a happier, better adjusted parent than would be the
case if the custodian's freedom of movement was more restrained.
Id. at 40.
22. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 393; Gordon, 339 N.W.2d at 271.
23. This balancing has been more readily recognized by legal scholars than by
the courts. See, e.g., Pastis, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Sex-Based Discrimi-
nation?, 16 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 419, 450 (1986) (arguing that balancing has been
used by the courts as a basis for sex discrimination in prohibiting a custodial mother
from moving the child out of state); Raines,Joint Custody and the Right to Travel: Legal
and Psychological Implications, 24 J. FAM. L. 625, 633-37 (1986) (balancing leads the
court to raise the interests of the parents over those of the child).
24. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399; Gordon, 339 N.W.2d at 271.
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ent. The court should do away with the presumption that removal is
in the best interests of the child. The burden of proof should be on
the custodial parent to show that the move is in fact in the best inter-
ests of the child. This would raise the interests of the child above the
interests of either parent. It would also serve the statutory purposes
set out by the Minnesota Legislature for awarding joint custody and
visitation.25
I. CHILD CUSTODY
Sociological and psychological research shows that children of di-
vorce often suffer severe psychological, physical, and emotional
harm.2 6 In the past, it was thought that such harm could be traced to
the traumatic nature of the divorce process itself.27 However, recent
scientific evidence points to the effects of parental conflict and the
typical sole custody arrangement. 28
The effects of parental conflict can be devastating. Children often
experience a wide range of detrimental feelings in the wake of di-
vorce. These feelings include blame, self-doubt, and conflicting loy-
alties.29 Such feelings often lead to strained relationships between
the child and both parents.3o The effects of parental conflict become
exacerbated in a sole custody arrangement.
In a typical sole custody setting, the legal and physical custody of
the child is given to one parent.3' The custodial parent has the legal
right and responsibility for making the major decisions that affect the
child's welfare.32 The custodial parent is also responsible for making
the day-to-day decisions that affect the child. ,3 Contact between the
child and the noncustodial parent is usually minimal. What contact
there is, is usually structured by the court and permitted only to pro-
tect the noncustodial parent's visitation rights.34
25. MINN. STAT. § 518.003 (1982); MINN. STAT. § 518.175 (1984).
26. See, e.g. ,Jacobs, The Effects of Divorce on Fathers: An Overview of the Literature, 139
AM. J. PSYCH. 1235 (1982) (anti-social action frequently found among children of
divorce).
27. See WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 153 (initial stages of divorce usually charac-
terized by bitter and agitated interaction between the parents).
28. Felner & Felner, Social Policy for Child Custody: A Multidisciplinary Framework, 50
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 341, 342 (1981) (custody disputes prolong the divorce
crisis).
29. Crumley & Blumenthal, Children's Reactions to Temporary Loss of Father, 130 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 778, 781 (1973) (children of divorce often sense abandonment or
betrayal).
30. Id. at 786-88.
31. See MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 3(a) (1982).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. MINN. STAT. § 518.175 (1988).
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Joint custody developed out of the dissatisfaction with sole custody
and its consequences. The trend is to define joint custody in terms
of shared decision making regarding the health, education, and wel-
fare of the child.35 In a joint custody arrangement, neither parent
has a legal advantage over the other. Neither parent can make a ma-
jor decision affecting the child's upbringing without the equal partic-
ipation of the other parent. The details of this shared responsibility
are generally left to the parents to work out between themselves.36
There is evidence today, both empirical and clinical, that joint cus-
tody works.3 7 The best interests of the child, in terms of psychologi-
cal, physical, and emotional needs, are served when the child's
attachments to both parents can be maintained.38 More than thirty
states have created a statutory preference or presumption in favor of
joint custody.3 9 These differing statutory approaches reflect a grow-
ing recognition that it is in the public policy interest to promote as
much contact as possible between the child and both parents after
divorce. Parents are encouraged to share the responsibilities and
rights that go hand-in-hand with child rearing.
In 1981, the Minnesota Legislature followed the trend towards
favoring the joint custody award. Minnesota's marriage dissolution
statutes were amended to expressly provide the courts with the alter-
native of awarding joint custody upon divorce, separation, or annul-
ment.40 In 1986, the Minnesota Legislature established a rebuttable
35. See Vitalis v. Vitalis, 363 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (joint legal
custody held to exist where parents shared in the major decisions affecting the child
although not provided for by the divorce decree).
36. See, e.g., Heard v. Heard, 353 N.W.2d 157, 161 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (joint
legal custody is premised on the ability of both parents to cooperate in the rearing of
their children).
37. See generally WALLERSTEIN, supra note I at 310 (finding that it is desireable for
children to continue their relationship with both parents following divorce). For a
list of studies that support this contention, see Wallerstein & Kelly, Children & Divorce:
A Review, 24 Soc. WORK 468 (1979).
38. See, e.g., Abarbanel, Shared Parenting After Separation and Divorce: A Study ofJoint
Custody, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 320, 328 (1981) (children most comfortable
were those who were able to keep strong attachments to two psychological parents);
Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint Custody Arrangement: A Report of A Study, 51
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403, 408 (1980) (finding that two-thirds of children in joint
custody studied did well psychologically).
There is, however, a small group of social scientists who argue that contact be-
tween the child and the noncustodial parent does little to develop the emotional well-
being of the child. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 37-38 (1973) (arguing that there should be a single custo-
dial parent with all the legal rights and responsibilities concerning the child in all
cases where the parents have difficulty in communicating with one another).
39. For a good survey of the child custody statutes in the United States, see
Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, 18 FAM. L. Q 369, 428-37 (1985).
40. MINN. STAT. § 518.17, 3 (1988).
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presumption that upon the request of either or both parents, joint
legal custody is in the best interests of the child.41
A number of states have passed statutes that specify factors to be
considered by the courts in awarding initial custody. In Minnesota,
for example, the legislature has specified ten factors that the courts
must recognize in awarding initial custody.42 The Minnesota courts,
in determining initial custody, must be guided by the best interests
of the child. 43 Furthermore, such a consideration must not prefer
one parent over another solely on the basis of the sex of one par-
ent.44 If the court considers either joint physical or joint legal cus-
tody as viable options, three additional factors must be appraised.
These are (1) the ability of the parents to cooperate in raising the
41. MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 2(c) (1988); see also Nies v. Nies, 407 N.W.2d
484, 486-87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (joint legal custody not awarded where such an
award would not be in the best interests of the child); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 403
N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (statute establishes a rebuttable presumption
that joint legal custody is in the child's best interests); Barrett v. Barrett, 394 N.W.2d
274, 278 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (joint legal custody awarded where there was no
evidence to indicate that the parents could not cooperate in raising their children).
42. MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1988). These factors are:
(a) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;
(b) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be
of sufficient age to express preference;
(c) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with a parents or par-
ents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interests;
(d) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
(e) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environ-
ment and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(f) the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home;
(g) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(h) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love, affec-
tion, and guidance, and to continue educating and raising the child in
the child's culture and religion or creed, if any;
(i) the child's cultural background; and
(j) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if related to domestic
abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, that has occurred between the par-
ents.
Id.
43. The best interests of the child means "all relevant factors to be considered
and evaluated by the court." MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1988). The court is thus
not limited to the criteria set out by statute.
44. Id. at subd. 3. A court is not to consider the conduct of a proposed custodian
that does not affect his or her relationship with the child. Id. at subd. 1. While paren-
tal mistreatment of a child will of course be considered by the court in determining
custody, evidence of spousal abuse has yet to be accepted as relevant in awarding
custody. For the argument that spousal abuse should establish a statutory presump-
tion of unfitness on the part of the abuser see, Note, Domestic 'iolence and Custody
Litigation: The Need for Statutory Reform, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407, 413 (1985) (arguing
that the court's reluctance to give sufficient weight to evidence of wife beating is a
reflection of society's tolerance of violence of husbands against wives).
1989]
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child;45 (2) the willingness of the parents to develop methods for
resolving disputes regarding major decisions about the child;46 and
(3) whether it would be detrimental to the child if one parent were to
have exclusive control over the child.47 After all of the factors are
considered, the court must determine whether the legal and physical
custody of the child will be sole orjoint.48 The rights and responsi-
bilities of the parents are defined by statute.49
II. VISITATION
Any award of sole or joint custody usually also provides for visita-
tion by the noncustodial parent. 50 There seems to be little question
that visitation is important to the continued psychological and emo-
tional well-being of the child.51 Visitation permits the child to con-
tinue to receive the love and support of the noncustodial parent.
The courts themselves recognize the importance' of visitation in
maintaining the psychological bond between the child and the non-
custodial parent. 52 Some courts have gone so far as to identify visita-
45. MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 2(a) (1988).
46. Id. at subd. 2 (b).
47. Id. at subd. 2 (c).
48. Id. at subd. 3. Minnesota has not yet addressed the issue whether a court
may award joint legal custody without joint physical custody where neither party re-
quests it.
The Minnesota courts have generally not looked favorably to joint physical cus-
tody schemes. See, e.g., McDermott v. McDermott, 192 Minn. 32, 36, 255 N.W. 247,
248 (1934) (divided custody proper only in exceptional circumstances); Brauer v.
Brauer, 384 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (divided custody is usually not
in the best interests of the child and is appropriate only in exceptional circum-
stances).
Joint physical custody is usually exercised through some kind of rotating plan
where the child spends an equal amount of time with both parents. The courts have
tended to view such schemes as adverse to the emotional and psychological health of
the child. Such schemes also interfere with the child's sense of continuity. See Brauer,
384 N.W.2d at 598.
49. MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 3 (1988).
50. There has been much scholarly debate over the nature and importance of
visitation. Some authors have gone so far as to call for an end to visitation. See, e.g.,
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38 at 37-38 (arguing that in order to protect the ongoing
relationship between the custodial parent and the child, the noncustodial parent
should have no legally enforceable visitation rights).
51. See, e.g., Comment, Post-Divorce Visitation: A Study in the Deprivation of Rights, 27
DE PAUL L. REV. 113, 123 (1977) (the support and love of the absent noncustodial
parent vital to the continued psychological well-being of the child); Note, The Califor-
nia Custody Decree, 13 STAN. L. REv. 108, 114 (1960) (child's emotional development
depends on continued contact with both parents after divorce).
52. See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 267 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. 1978) (visitation is a
"parental right that is essential to continuation and maintenance of a child-to-parent
relationship between the child and noncustodial parent").
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tion with the best interests of the child.53
The Minnesota Legislature has recognized that it is important for
the noncustodial parent to maintain a relationship with the child
through visitation.54 Minnesota has raised visitation to the level of
public policy in order to encourage a continuing relationship be-
tween the child and both parents.55 Thus, the Minnesota courts are
given the power to go so far as to change custody when a custodial
parent interferes with the visitation rights of the noncustodial par-
ent.5 6 Courts may also hold the violating parent in contempt of
court for violating a visitation agreement.57 There seems to be little
question that the Minnesota Legislature and the courts view visita-
tion rights to be important. Interference with visitation could affect
the parent's right to custody itself.
Minnesota and other jurisdictions, however, recognize that the
noncustodial parent's visitation rights are not absolute.58 They are
to be exercised "only when in the best interests of the child and to
the extent their exercise will be beneficial to the child."59 Thus, a
parent's right to visitation is only one factor to be considered by the
court in determining the best interests of the child.60 The interests
of the custodial parent and the child may override the noncustodial
53. See, e.g., Halper v. Halper, 348 N.W.2d 360, 364-65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(liberal visitation may serve the best interests of the child).
54. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subd. 4 (Supp. 1989).
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also Sefkow v. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d 37, 46-47 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(interference with visitation by a custodial parent a factor to be considered in deter-
mining who should have joint custody).
57. There is disagreement among the courts, however, as to who actually has the
right of visitation: the custodial parent, the noncustodial parent, or the child. See, e.g.,
Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 487, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972) (primarily a right
of the child and secondarily a right of the noncustodial parent); Weiss v. Weiss, 52
N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1981) (ajoint right of
the noncustodial parent and child); Application of Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 986,
229 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962) (right to visitation a natural right of
parent).
58. See, e.g., Raymond v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 739, 345 A.2d 48, 52 (1974)
(privilege of visitation is not an absolute right); In Re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d
822, 827 (Iowa, 1978) (visitation rights are not absolute but derivative from the best
interests of the child); Krause v. Krause, 58 Wis. 2d 499, 506, 206 N.W.2d 589, 596
(1973) (parental right of visitation is a sacred one but not necessarily an absolute
one).
59. Manthei v. Manthei, 268 N.W.2d 45, 45 (Minn. 1978). See also Bernick, 31
Colo. App. at 486, 505 P.2d at 15 (visitation decisions must be based on serving the
best interests of the child); Lower, 269 N.W.2d at 827 (visitation rights are
subordinate to the best interests of the child); Veiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 173, 418 N.E.2d at
380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (visitation rights of parent to be protected only if the physi-
cal and emotional well-being of the child are so served); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60
Wis. 2d 283, 291, 208 N.W.2d 336, 339 (1973) (interests of the child are paramount).
60. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Hutchins, 84 Mich. App. 236, 237, 269 N.W.2d 539, 540
19891 1033
9
Izek: Child Removal after Divorce in Minnesota: A Time to Re-examine Wh
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
parent's right to visitation.61
III. CHILD MODIFICATION
Minnesota and other jurisdictions have moved away from a "pa-
rental right" frame of reference in determining child custody and
visitation. Decisions by the court must serve the best interests of the
child. This same overriding concern with protecting the best inter-
ests of the child is also applied when one parent seeks to modify cus-
tody. In Minnesota, custody will not be modified unless the court
finds that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or
the child's custodial parent and modification is necessary to serve the
best interests of the child.62 In addition, custody modification will
not be granted unless the courts also find that:
(i) The custodian agrees to the modification;
(ii) The child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner
with the consent of the custodian; or
(iii) The child's present environment endangers the child's physi-
cal or emotional health or impairs the child's emotional de-
velopment and the harm likely to be caused by a change of
environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to
the child.6
3
IV. THE ISSUE OF REMOVAL
It is not surprising that when the courts are confronted with a cus-
todial parent's desire to move a child out of state, the courts attempt
to resolve the matter by offering a solution based on what it per-
(1978) (parent's right to visitation is one factor to be considered to the extent that it
is relevant in determining the best interests of the child).
61. See, e.g., Lower, 269 N.W.2d at 826 ("[w]hile there is much to be said for the
maintenance of visitation rights by the non-custodial parent ... the interests of the
custodial parent and the child may be overriding").
62. MINN. STAT. § 518.18 subd. (d) (1986). The change in circumstances must
have taken place since the last decree order. See, e.g., Englund v. Englund, 352
N.W.2d 800, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (change in circumstances must have oc-
curred since initial custody determination).
Minnesota law permits a noncustodial parent to bring a motion to change cus-
tody. MINN. STAT. § 518.18 (1982). The parent opposing a change of custody, how-
ever, has a right to an evidentiary hearing. Nice-Peterson v. Nice-Peterson, 310
N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. 1981) (trial court erred in not scheduling an evidentiary
hearing to consider the competing positions of the parties). The parent seeking a
change in custody, however, is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless a prima
facie case is first established showing that a change of custody is justified. Id.
63. MINN. STAT. § 518.18 subd. (d) (1986); see also Gunderson v. Preuss, 336
N.W.2d 546, 547 (Minn. 1983); In Re Marriage of Gottenborg, 343 N.W.2d 674, 676
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984). If the criteria for child modification set out by the statute are
not met, the court is required to deny the motion. See, e.g., Nice-Peterson, 310 N.W.2d
at 472 (trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for child modification
where statutory requirements not met).
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ceives to be the best interests of the child.64 It is the same standard
used by the court in determining initial child custody, custody modi-
fication, and visitation. The best interests of the child, however, are
often more difficult to identify in a removal context. This is espe-
cially true when the court, in awarding joint custody and visitation,
has already recognized that it is in the best interests of the child to
maintain a close relationship with both the custodial and noncus-
todial parent. A move out of state might threaten the ability of the
noncustodial parent to keep a nurturing relationship with the child.
Moreover, such a move is bound to affect the noncustodial parent's
visitation rights and ability to equally share in the major decisions
that affect the welfare of the child. The question then becomes what
interests may override the child's interest in having a continued rela-
tionship with the noncustodial parent.
The courts have not agreed on how to address a custodial parent's
request to move or the efforts of a noncustodial parent to prevent a
move. 65 The custodial parent's desire to move may be based on a
number of considerations: to take advantage of a new job opportu-
nity;66 to reduce postdivorce tensions;67 to join a new spouse whose
new job would provide income to support the parent and child;68 to
join a fiance;69 to take advantage of a better educational opportu-
nity;70 to take advantage of new business opportunities; 7 1 to further
64. The best interests standard has been criticized on the grounds that the court
lacks the competence to make decisions based on this standard when removal is re-
quested. See, e.g., Pastis, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Sex Based Discrimina-
lion? 16 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 419 (1986).
65. This lack of consensus is also to be found among legal commentators. See,
e.g., Pastis, supra note 64, at 431-32 (arguing that the court has no right or responsi-
bility to intervene in a custodial parent's decision to move); Note, The Judicial Role in
Post-Divorce Child Relocation Controversies, 35 STAN. L. REV. 949, 949-50 (1983) (arguing
that judicial intervention is an unwarranted interference with family autonomy and
the custodial parent's freedom); Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1383, 1394 (1974) (arguing that the courts have generally failed to advance the per-
sonal interests of the child in removal settings). But see RainesJoint Custody And The
Right To Travel: Legal and Psychological Implications, 24 J. FAM. L. 625, 656 (1986) (a
custodial parent should not be allowed to remove a child unless it is clear that the
move is in the child's best interests).
66. See, e.g., Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 486, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972)
(petitioner afforded an opportunity to practice law in a new city).
67. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Young, 514 Colo. App. 321, 322, 529 P.2d 344,
345 (1974) (custodial parent wished to move because of children's discipline and
adjustment problems after divorce).
68. Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 87 (N.D. 1981) (custodial mother wished to
join new father who will have an income to support the wife and children).
69. See, e.g., Garland v. Garland, 19 111. App. 3d 951, 954, 312 N.E.2d 811, 814
(1974) (custodial parent wished to join fiance who had secured full-time employment
and expressed willingness to marry petitioner if move granted).
70. See, e.g., Burich, 314 N.W.2d at 87 (custodial parent wished to move to accept
teaching position in another county).
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the parent's personal interests;72 to live with relatives;73 to begin a
job already secured; 74 to search for employment in a more advanta-
geous area;75 to fulfill obligations;76 or to support and raise the
child.77
The noncustodial parent may oppose the move for a number of
reasons. The most obvious reason is that the noncustodial parent
wants to keep the child close to where he or she lives. The noncus-
todial parent, however, may be motivated by less benevolent
concerns.
Jurisdictions have taken a number of approaches when faced with
opposition by the noncustodial parent to a petition for removal by
the custodial parent. Many states have passed laws that require a
parent to seek permission from the court before removing the child
from the jurisdiction.78 Courts have written restrictive mobility
clauses in the custody decrees, themselves, in order to anticipate the
71. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Iowa 1976)
(custodial parent wished to move to another county to accept a teaching position);
Nedrow v. Nedrow, 48 Wash. 2d 243, 245, 292 P.2d 872, 875 (1956) (custodial par-
ent's new husband offered regular employment in a new job out of state).
72. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Burgham, 86 111. App. 3d 341, 344, 408 N.E.2d 37,
40 (1980) (custodial mother wished to move for personal reasons).
73. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 93 A.D.2d 807, 809, 460 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (1983)
(petitioner wished to join family and friends who lived elsewhere and would provide
emotional support).
74. See, e.g., D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super 200, 204, 365 A.2d 27,
31-32 (N.J. Ch. 1976) (petitioner found employment as a bookkeeper in another
state).
75. See, e.g., Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 172, 418 N.E.2d 377, 379, 436
N.Y.S.2d 862, 864 (1981) (custodial mother sought to move out of state where she
would be able to find suitable employment).
76. See, e.g., Tanttila v. Tanttila, 152 Colo. 446, 447, 382 P.2d 798, 800 (1963)
(where petitioner sought to move out of state in order to better raise the children,
carry out custodial responsibilities under less economic stress and mental tension);
Gottschall v. Gottschall, 210 Neb. 679, 680, 316 N.W.2d 610, 611 (1982) (petitioner
sought to move to care for her children and be near her fiance); Groh v. Groh, 110
Wis. 2d 117, 118, 327 N.W.2d 655, 656 (1983) (custodial mother sought to move
where there was a better environment and where she could live more cheaply).
77. See, e.g., Groh at 118, 327 N.W.2d at 656 (petitioner wished to move to better
able support the children).
78. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subd. 3 (1988); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAws
ANN. § 25-5-13 (1984) ("A parent entitled to the custody of a child has the right to
change his residence subject to the power of the circuit court to restrain a removal
which would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2
(West 1976) (minors not to be removed out of state "without the consent of both
parents, unless the court upon cause shown, shall otherwise order").
Such statutes were probably. passed so the court would not lose its jurisdictional
authority to enforce divorce decrees if the custodial parent moved out of state with
the child. See, e.g., Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1983) ("In the past,
removal was commonly denied because of the potential loss ofjurisdiction over cus-
tody issues"). This concern was alleviated by the adoption in most states of the Uni-
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problems that might arise later when removal is at issue.79 Such
clauses often prohibit a parent from removing the child from the ju-
risdiction for a set period of time. 80
In the face of such restrictions, a custodial parent seeking to move
out of state must ask permission from either the noncustodial parent
or the court. Failure to do so may result in the custodial parent be-
ing held in contempt.8 1 In such circumstances, courts have gone so
far as to change maintenance or child support payments 82 or require
the surrender of custody.83 Even when the custodial parent is not
restricted by either statute or divorce decree, the noncustodial par-
ent may attempt to block the move. The noncustodial parent may
claim that the move amounts to a change of circumstances that ad-
versely affects either visitation rights or the child's best interests.
It is clear that there exists a lack ofjudicial consensus on the issue
of removal. Jurisdictions can be divided between those who gener-
ally recognize a custodial parent's right to move and those who do
not.8 4 Jurisdictions that do not recognize a custodial parent's right
to move have held that contact with both parents remains essential to
the healthy emotional and psychological development of the child.85
This is the overriding concern of the court when removal is re-
quested. The burden of proof is on the parent requesting the move
to show that it is in the best interests of the child. In Whitman v.
Whitman,86 the court reasoned that:
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Minnesota adopted the Act in 1977. See MINN.
STAT. § 518A.01 (1988).
79. See, e.g., Carney v. Carney, I Kan. App. 2d 544, 545, 571 P.2d 56, 57 (1977)
(custodial parent required to obtain court approval before removing children from
the state for more than 30 days).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 395, 396 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (issue
was whether custodial parent could be held in contempt for removing children ab-
sent a court order).
82. See, e.g., Ryan v. Ryan, 300 Minn. 244, 249, 219 N.W.2d 912, 916 (1974)
(maintenance payments suspended when child removed); Fish v. Fish, 280 Minn.
316, 323-25, 159 N.W.2d 271, 276-77 (1968) (child support payments stopped when
p arent left jurisdiction).
83. See, e.g., Brandon v. Faulk, 326 So. 2d 76, 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
336 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1976) (custody of child transferred to grandparents where it was
unreasonable for custodial parent to move with the child out of the jurisdiction); In
Re Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 437, 595 P.2d 474, 476 (1979) (trial court or-
dered that if custodial parent moved with the child out of state, child custody would
be modified in favor of the noncustodial parent); Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d
283, 284, 208 N.W.2d 336, 337 (1973) (court ordered custody transferred to noncus-
todial parent where custodial parent moved with the child out of state in violation of
court order).
84. See cases cited infra notes 88-96.
85. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
86. 28 Wis. 2d 50, 135 N.W.2d 835 (1965).
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[a] divorced man or woman is free to move about and pursue his or
her life and living without restraint from his former spouse; as di-
vorced parents of minor children they may be required to curtail
these liberties or forfeit some of their rights to custody or visita-
tion, as the case may be consistent with the best interests of the
child and the rights of the other parent.
8 7
Jurisdictions that recognize a custodial parent's right to move have
tended to identify the best interests of the child with the best inter-
ests of the custodial parent.88 Thus, a request for removal will be
granted unless it can be shown that such a move is not in the best
interests of the child or that specific harm will come to the child if
removal is granted. 89 This more liberal perspective views judicial in-
tervention in a removal setting as unwarranted. 90 Generally, if the
custodial parent has a good reason for moving, removal will be
granted. 9 1 The more objective the reason, the more likely removal
will be permitted.92 The burden of proof is on the parent opposing
the move to show that the move is not in the best interests of the
child.os
V. THE A ICE PRESUMPTION
In 1983, Minnesota joined the ranks of those states that liberally
permit a custodial parent to move out of state with a child. In Auge v.
Auge,9 4 the custodial mother had sole legal custody while the father
had been given visitation rights.9 5 The mother petitioned the court
87. Id. at 58, 135 N.W.2d at 839.
88. See, e.g., Tandy v. Tandy, 42 I1l. App. 3d 87, 89, 355 N.E.2d 585, 587 (I11. Ct.
App. 1976) (generally in the child's best interests to remain with the parent granted
initial custody).
89. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Siklossy, 51 111. App. 3d 44, 47, 409 N.E.2d 29, 32
(Ill. Ct. App. 1980) (court should not oppose removal unless there is a specific show-
ing that the move would be adverse to the child's best interests).
90. See, e.g., Meier v. Meier, 36 Or. App. 685, 688, 585 P.2d 713, 716 (Or. Ct.
App. 1978) ("judicial discretion should not be exercised to regulate decisions such as
choice of residence which are normally parental not judicial decisions unless due to
exceptional circumstances there is a clear danger to the child's well being").
91. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Hutchins, 84 Mich. App. 236, 237, 269 N.W.2d 539, 540
(Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (Beasley, J., concurring) (there should be no presumption that
raising a child in one state is superior to bringing up a child in another state).
92. See, e.g., Jafari v. Jafari, 284 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Neb. 1979) (court permitting
the custodial parent to move with the child as long as the reasons for the move are
legitimate and in the best interests of the child).
93. See, e.g., Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 321, 322 505 P.2d 14, 15-16
(Colo. Ct. App. 1972) (decisions of custodial parent made in good faith should be
presumed to have been made in the best interests of the child).
94. 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983).
95. Id. at 395. For a good discussion of the Auge decision see Note, The Illusion of
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to move with the child from Minnesota to Hawaii. 9 6 The lower court
denied her permission to do so without an evidentiary hearing.97
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and held that a full eviden-
tiary hearing was required.98 The court also set forth the following
rule to be applied when removing the child to another state: "Mo-
tions for removal brought by the custodial parent may not be denied
without an evidentiary hearing, where denial would effect a modifica-
tion of custody. Unless the party opposing the motion for removal
makes a prima facie showing against removal, permission may be
granted without an evidentiary hearing." 9 9
The Auge court further held that the court must defer to the custo-
dial parent's decisions concerning health, religion or education un-
less it determines after an evidentiary hearing that the move would
endanger the child's health or development.OO The court took the
position that:
Motions by the custodial parent to permit removal to another state
shall be granted unless the party opposing the motion establishes
by a preponderance of the evidence that the move is not in the best
interests of the child. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (1982). If denial of
the motion will likely result in a modification of custody, the trial
court must consider the negative effects of separating the child and
the custodial parent. Id. 101
The Auge court relied heavily on D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio. 102 In
D'Onofrio, the Superior Court of New Jersey examined the anti-re-
moval provisions of its statutes in the context of a removal peti-
tion.103 The court focused on the new family unit created after
divorce. This family unit consisted solely of the custodial parent and
the child.104 The court concluded that 'the best interests of the child
is to be assessed in the context of what is in the best interests of the
new postdivorce custodial family.105 The court reasoned that "[t]he
new family unit consists only of the children and the custodial par-
ent, and what is advantageous to that unit as a whole, to each of its
96. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 395.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 395. In determining when a hearing is required pursuant to Minnesota
Statute section 518.176, subdivision 1 (1982), the court noted that "questions of the
child's health and development are unlikely to be adequately resolved by mere argu-
ments of counsel." Id. at 397. Thus, affidavits and other documentary evidence must
be presented by the party wishing to interfere with the custodial parent's decisions.
Id.
99. Id. at 399 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 399-400.
101. Id. at 399.
102. 144 N.J. Super 200, 365 A.2d 27 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
103. D'Onofrio, 144 NJ. Super. 200 at 202, 365 A.2d at 29.
104. Id. at 29-30.
105. Id. at 30.
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members individually and the way they relate to each other and func-
tion together is obviously in the best interests of the children."10 6
The Auge court adopted the D'Onofrio concept that with divorce a
new family unit is created by divorce, consisting only of the custodial
parent and child.107 However, the Auge court went further and
adopted the presumption that permission to remove should be
granted where there is no showing that the move is against the
child's interests, placing the burden on the noncustodial parent.108
The court set out four reasons for adopting this presumption: (1) it
eliminates any need to re-determine which parent is best suited to
have child custody; (2) it reduces judicial interference with the new
family unit and maintains the child in the family in which he or she
currently belongs; (3) it is consistent with Minnesota's statutory
scheme; and (4) it places the decision with the custodial parent, who
is in the best position to determine the best interests of the child.109
The Auge court went on to address the limits dictated by Minne-
sota's child custody modification statutes when a custodial parent re-
quests the court's permission to remove a child to another state."I0
Minnesota statute provides that removal is to be denied if the pur-
pose of the move is to interfere with the visitation rights of the non-
custodial parent.''' The Auge court held that when removal is
permitted the court can modify the visitation order as necessary to
maintain a good relationship between the noncustodial parent and
the child. It may also make appropriate adjustments in child support
to spread the cost of visitation in an equitable manner, provided that
such adjustments are not against the best interest of the child.12
The Auge court established a presumption that a parent having sole
legal and physical custody of a child is entitled to move the child to
another state. Auge did not involve a joint custody arrangement.
Moreover, none of the cases cited by the Auge court in support of its
presumption involved a joint legal custody situation. The issue re-
mained whether the Auge presumption was justified in a setting
where joint legal custody of a child was shared by a noncustodial
parent. The Minnesota Supreme Court answered this question in
Gordon v. Gordon. 13
106. Id. at 29-30.
107. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 398.
108. Id. at 398-99.
109. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399.
110. Id. at 399-400.
111. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subd. 3 (1982).
112. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 400.
113. 339 N.W.2d 269 (Minn. 1983).
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VI. THE GORDON PRESUMPTION
The marriage of Sandra and Stephen Gordon was legally dissolved
inJuly 1982. The divorce decree awarded joint legal custody of their
three minor children to both parents while sole physical custody was
given to Sandra subject to Stephen's exercise of reasonable and lib-
eral visitation. In October 1982, Sandra asked the county court for
an order permitting her to move with the children to Illinois. She
had obtained employment in Illinois and asserted that the relocation
would be in the best interests of the children because they would
remain in the physical custody of their primary caretaker and
parent." 14
Stephen opposed the motion and moved to modify the custody
arrangement in order to obtain sole physical custody of the children.
The county court held a full evidentiary hearing at Stephen's re-
quest. It concluded that while the relocation would not further the
best interests of the children, it would have serious adverse effects.
Accordingly, the court ordered that Sandra be allowed to remove the
children to Illinois and denied Stephen's motion for a change of
custody.I 15
Stephen appealed the decision to a three-judge district court
panel. The panel concluded that removal was not in the best inter-
ests of the children and reversed the county court decision.]16
The Minnesota Supreme Court was now confronted with three dis-
tinct issues on appeal. The first issue was tied with the court's earlier
decision in Auge v. Auge, where the court held that if a parent has sole
legal and physical custody, a presumption exists that a parent's deci-
sion to move out of state is in the best interests of the child.' 17 The
presumption is subject to a showing by the noncustodial parent that
the move is not in the best interests of the child.' 18 However, Gordon
involved a joint legal custody situation.' 19 Thus, the court was
presented with the issue of whether the presumption established by
the court in Auge extended to joint legal custody cases.120
The court answered this question in the affirmative. It reasoned
that the county court had already determined in the initial dissolu-
tion decree that physical custody be given to Sandra.121 This was
deemed to be in the best interests of the children.122 Sandra, as the
114. Id. at 270.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1983).
118. Id. at 399.
119. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d at 270.
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custodial parent and primary caregiver, was in the best position to
determine where the children should live while with her.123 There-
fore, the presumption in favor of the custodial parent's decision to
move extended to joint legal custody cases.124
The second issue was whether Stephen overcame this presumption
and established by a preponderance of the evidence that the move
would not be in the best interests of the children. 125 The court sum-
marily concluded, without further investigation, that Stephen did not
meet his burden of proof.126
The third issue was whether removal would interfere with Ste-
phen's ability to continue to share in the major education, religious,
or health-care decisions that would affect the children or with his vis-
itation rights.127 The court held that there was no evidence to show
such interference. 128
Therefore, the court reversed the district panel's decision and re-
manded the case to the Dakota County Court. 129 The court was in-
structed to reinstate the original county court decision and permit
Sandra to move with the children to Illinois.30
Justice Peterson wrote for three dissenters.131 He argued that the
extension of Auge to joint legal custody cases undercut the impor-
tance of awarding both parents equal rights and responsibilities:
"Once the child is removed from the state, the noncustodial parent's
right to participate in the major decisions regarding the child's up-
bringing may be substantially diminished."132
Justice Peterson further argued that any examination of the best
interests of the children should be done without presumptions where
joint legal custody has been awarded.133 The court's extension of
Auge to joint custody cases misdirects the court's attention away from
the best interests of the child. Justice Peterson concluded that Auge
123. Id. Minnesota's statute provides that the custodial parent has physical cus-
tody and thereby may determine where the child will live. MINN. STAT. § 518.003,
subd. 3(e) (1988).
124. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d at 271.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court stated that the father had merely introduced evidence that the
proposed move would not be in his own best interests. Id. The dissent claimed that
the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry as to whether the best interests of
the children would be served by the move. Id. at 273-74 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 272.
128. Id. The majority implied that while the move would make visitation more
difficult, accommodations could be made given Stephen's annual income of approxi-
mately $130,000. Id. at 271, n.l.
129. Id. at 272.
130. Id.
131. Id. Also dissenting were Justices Scott and Yetka.
132. Id. at 272.
133. Id. at 273.
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should not be precedent in joint legal custody cases.13 4
VII. A TIME FOR RE-ASSESSMENT
The presumption established by the court in Auge is based on
sound legal and public policy foundations. However, the extension
of this presumption by the court in Gordon to joint legal custody cases
is unjustified. It is in fundamental conflict with the statutory pur-
poses set out by the Minnesota Legislature for awarding joint legal
custody and visitation.135
The Auge decision is consistent with the statutory purposes of sole
legal custody. When the traditional family unit has broken down, the
court awards custody to the parent it believes is best qualified to pro-
tect the best interests of the child.136 The custodial parent is given
ultimate legal control over the child.137 The noncustodial parent is
excluded from decisions affecting the child. It can be presumed that
the custodial parent who exercises unilateral decision-making au-
thority over the child is in the best position to make the major deci-
sions that affect the child's upbringing. This includes the decision to
move with the child out of state. There is no reason for the court to
question the custodial parent's reasons for moving or whether the
move is in the best interests of the child. The court has already de-
termined that it is in the best interests of the child that he or she
remain with the custodial parent when it made the initial custody
award.
The argument that a new family unit consisting solely of the custo-
dial parent and child is best made in a sole custody arrangement.
The custody award requires the custodial parent to assume rights
and responsibilities with regard to the upbringing of the child that
had been shared by both parents.138 The custodial parent must now
solely support and care for the child. In a real sense the custodial
parent is head of a new postdivorce family.
The principle of family autonomy should prevent the courts from
interfering with the custodial parent's request to move with the child.
The court has no interest in a family unit that is functioning properly
and is intact. In a sole legal custody setting, the custodial parent is in
the best position to determine what is in the best interests of the new
family unit consisting of the custodial parent and child. The court
has no reason to second-guess a custodial parent's decision to move.
The Auge decision is also consistent with the purposes of visitation
134. Id. at 272.
135. MINN. STAT. §§ 518.003, 518.175, subd. 3 (1988).
136. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17 subd. 1 (1988).
137. See, MINN. STAT. § 518.176 subd. 1 (1988) (at the time of the custody order,
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when sole legal custody has been awarded. The purpose of visitation
when sole legal custody has been awarded is not necessarily to fur-
ther the interests of the child by fostering the relationship between
the child and the noncustodial parent. The purpose of visitation is to
protect the "parental rights" of the noncustodial parent to see the
child.'39 The visitation right itself is thus limited given the limited
purposes of sole legal custody. Visitation does not extend to deci-
sions that affect the child's welfare in the new postdivorce family
unit. This position was summed up by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in D'Onofrio:140
[A] noncustodial parent is perfectly free to remove himself from
this jurisdiction despite the continued residency here of his chil-
dren in order to seek opportunities for a better or different life
style. . . . And if he does choose to do so, the custodial parent
could hardly hope to restrain him from leaving this State on the
ground that his removal will either deprive the children of the pa-
ternal relationship or depreciate its quality. The custodial parent,
who bears the essential burden and responsibility for the children,
is clearly entitled to seek a better life for herself and the children,
particularly where the exercise of that option appears to be truly
advantageous to their interests and provided that the paternal in-
terest can continue to be accommodated, even if by a different visi-
tation agreement than theretofore.141
The presumption established by the court in Auge is consistent
with Minnesota's statutory scheme for awarding sole legal custody.
The Auge presumption, however, is inconsistent with the statutory
purposes for awarding joint legal custody and visitation.
In Minnesota, joint legal custody means that "both parents have
equal rights and responsibilities, including the right to participate in
major decisions determining the child's upbringing, including educa-
tion, health care and religious training."142 The decision to move a
child out of state is a major decision affecting the child's upbringing.
It will have a significant impact on the child's life affecting the child's
home life, school, and friendships. A move out of state will also have
a significant impact on the child's relationship with the noncustodial
parent.
The Gordon court ignored these concerns by narrowly construing
Minnesota's joint legal custody statute. The court defined joint legal
custody as granting to "both the parents equal rights and responsi-
bilities in making major decisions involving the education, religion
139. See MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subd. 3 (1988).
140. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super 200, 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1976).
141. Id. at 207-08, 365 A.2d at 30.
142. MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (1988).
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and health care of the children."14 3 However, the statute's definition
is broader: "Joint legal custody means that both parents have equal
rights and responsibilities, including the right to participate in major
decisions determining the child's upbringing, including education,
health care, and religious training."144
The Minnesota Legislature clearly intended that both parents
equally share the rights and responsibilities in all important deci-
sions affecting the child's upbringing. Moreover, while such impor-
tant parental decisions may include education, health care, and
religious training, these kinds of decisions are not exclusive. For ex-
ample, a custodial parent's decision to move with a child out of state
should be considered a decision affecting the child's upbringing.
The court's decision in Gordon amounts to a modification of Min-
nesota's joint legal custody statute. The result is that the custodial
parent's decision-making authority is increased while the noncus-
todial parent's is decreased. This contravenes the language of the
statute by excluding the noncustodial parent from participating in
those "major decisions determining the child's upbringing" that do
not directly involve education, health care or religious training.145
Furthermore, the Gordon decision is not justified in terms of a new
postdivorce family unit. When joint legal custody is awarded, a new
family unit consisting of only the custodial parent and the child is not
created. The noncustodial parent continues to share in the major
decisions that affect the child. When a custodial parent moves with a
child out of state, that parent's decision greatly affects the ability of
the noncustodial parent to equally share in the major decisions af-
fecting the child's welfare. More importantly perhaps, the move in
many cases will undermine the emotional and psychological relations
between the child and the noncustodial parent.' 46 Generally, the
purpose of awarding joint legal custody in the first place is to foster
the bonds between the child and both parents.
The presumption that a custodial parent has a right to move also
undermines the statutory purposes of visitation when joint legal cus-
tody has been awarded. Minnesota statute provides that the court
shall "grant such rights of visitation as will enable the child and the
noncustodial parent to maintain a child to parent relationship that
will be in the best interests of the child."147 Moreover, "the court
shall not restrict a parent's visitation rights unless it finds that the
visitation is likely to endanger the child's physical or emotional
143. Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d at 271 (Minn. 1983).
144. MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (1988).
145. Id.
146. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 344-56.
147. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subd. 1 (1988).
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health or impair his emotional development."148
In awarding joint legal custody, the court has already determined
that it is in the best interests of the child to have as much contact
with the noncustodial parent as possible. The primary purpose of
visitation in a joint custody context is to foster the relationship be-
tween the child and the noncustodial parent. This purpose, how-
ever, is frustrated when the Auge presumption is applied in joint legal
custody cases. The court has failed to distinguish between the pur-
pose of visitation when joint legal custody has been awarded and
when sole legal custody has been ordered.
The court has also failed to recognize that the principle of family
autonomy is not impaired when the court intervenes to determine
the best interests of the child in a situation where joint custody has
been awarded. In a joint custody arrangement, the postdivorce fam-
ily unit consists of the custodial parent, the noncustodial parent, and
the child. If the parents disagree over removal, the family unit is
impaired and judicial intervention is therefore justified to protect the
child's best interests.
CONCLUSION
The Gordon court, in effect, established a balancing test. The inter-
ests of the custodial and noncustodial parents are weighed against
one another when removal is requested. Of course, there is no rea-
son to exclude the parents' interests from the court's considerations.
The child's best interests cannot be separated from those of the par-
ents. Moreover, the child's interests cannot be assessed in a vacuum
or in the abstract. However, such a balancing test focuses attention
on the parents rather than on the child, placing more importance on
parental rights than the interests of the child.
When joint custody has been awarded and the custodial parent in-
sists on moving, the best option in terms of the child's psychological
and emotional development is generally to deny the move. This per-
mits the child to remain near the noncustodial parent. Psychological
research clearly shows that a joint custody arrangement promoting
the child's maximum contact with both parents is usually in the
child's best interests.149 The possibility of maintaining and sus-
taining such an arrangement is severely impaired or even destroyed
if one parent decides to move out of state with the child.
It is important to note that it may of course be in the child's best
interests, both psychologically and nonpsychologically, to permit the
move. In either case, the focus of the court should be on the child.
The Minnesota Legislature requires that when joint legal custody
148. Id. at subd. 5 (1988).
149. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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is awarded, both parents share equal rights and responsibilities in
making major decisions determining the child's upbringing.150 The
Auge presumption does not permit equal participation by both par-
ents when the custodial parent decides to move with the child out of
state. Therefore, the court has no basis to believe that such a move
is necessarily in the best interests of the child. Moreover, there is no
reason to believe that the custodial parent's decision to move serves
the best interests of the child simply because the noncustodial parent
cannot overcome the presumption.
The Minnesota court should end the presumption that a custodial
parent's request to move is always in the best interests of the child
when joint legal custody has been awarded. The burden of proof
should be on the custodial parent to show that the move is in fact in
the best interests of the child.
The court, by placing the burden on the custodial parent attempt-
ing to move, assures that the parent's reasons for moving are consis-
tent with the child's best interests. Such an inquiry should look
beyond any superficial reasons that might be given by a parent for
moving. A court should analyze the parent's decision making pro-
cess and investigate what options, other than moving, may be avail-
able. It may be, for example, that while a parent may seem to have a
"legitimate" reason for moving, the parent's decision was really mo-
tivated by a desire to increase geographic distance from the noncus-
todial parent.
In determining the best interests of the child, the court must ex-
amine all of the factors that may affect the child's welfare. A move
may be advantageous to the custodial parent. Yet it is rarely in the
child's best interests to change locations following divorce.151 The
child must not only deal with the loss of the remaining parent, but
also significant environmental changes that can prove to be trau-
matic and stressful on the child 152 At the same time, the noncus-
todial parent suffers the loss of every day contact with the child
which may result in a loss of parental self-esteem.153 Courts must
consider the impact of the move on both the child and the remaining
parent, not simply what advantages one parent may gain from the
move at the possible expense of all other postdivorce family mem-
bers. Such an inquiry will place the focus of the court where it be-
longs-on the best interests of the child.
Hersch Izek
150. See MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (1988).
151. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 271-81.
152. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
153. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 221.
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